are effective policies to accomplish this goal. They also indicate that the tax policy may be more potent than the drinking age policy.
I. Introduction and Background
Since the mid 1970s, the Federal government of the United States and various state and local governments have been involved in a campaign to reduce deaths from motor vehicle accidents by discouraging alcohol abuse.
One major element of this campaign has been the upward trend In state minimum legal ages for the purchase and consumption of alcoholic beverages that began with the Increase In the legal drinking age in Minnesota from 18 to 19 years of age In 1976. An additional 27 states had increased legal drinking ages by the time of the Federal Uniform Drinking Act of July 1984.
This legislation allows the Federal government, through its control of Federal highway funds, to intercede in a legislative area traditionally reserved for states. Five percent of a state's Federal highway construction fund allocation for the fiscal year 1987 will be withheld if the minimum legal drinking age is below 21 years on October 1, 1986, and 10 percent will be withheld from the 1988 fiscal year allocation if its drinking age is below 21 on October 1, 1987. To date, 14 states have passed laws complying with the act, and a total of 37 states now have a minimum drinking age of 21. A second major element of the antidrinking campaign is reflected by more severe penalties for conviction of drunken driving, the allocation of additional resources to apprehend drunk drivers, and an easing in the standards required for conviction.
One policy that has been virtually ignored by the Federal and state governments in the antidrinking campaign is increased taxation of alcoholic beverages which, by raising prices, would lower alcoholic beverage corisumption and motor vehicle mortality. Instead, the Federal excise tax rates on liquor (distilled spirits), beer, and wine remained constant in nominal terms between November 1, 1951 and the end of fiscal 1985. During this period the Federal government taxed liquor at the rate of $10.50 per proof gallon (one gallon of 100 proof liquor, which is the equivalent of 50 percent alcohol by volume), beer at the rate of $.29 per gallon (approximately 4.5 percent alcohol by volume), and wine at the rate of $.17 per gallon 1 (between 11.6 percent and 21 percent alcohol by volume).
Partly as a result of the stability of the Federal excise taxes and the modest increases in state and local excise taxes, the real price of alcoholic beverages (the nominal price divided by the Consumer Price Index) has declined substantially over time. Between 1960 and , the real price of liquor fell by 48 percent; the real price of beer fell by 27 percent; and the real price of wine fell by 20 percent (Cook 1981) . While 29 states raised the legal drinking age from 1976 through 1984, real alcoholic beverage prices continued to fall: 27 percent for liquor, 12 percent for beer, and 19 percent for wine (Bureau of Labor Statistics various years).
Thus, as argued by Cook and Tauchen (1982) , if alcohol abuse is sensitive to price, a government policy of declining real excise tax levels actually may be exacerbating this problem.
A primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the responsiveness of motor vehicle death rates of youths aged 15 through 24 to variations in the cost of beer as reflected by differences in state excise tax rates on beer.
Thus, we provide evidence for this important age group on the extent to which declining real beer excise taxes have contributed to increases in fatal motor vehicle crashes and on the extent to which increases in real beer taxes can serve as a potent instrument in the antidrinking campaign.
We also examine the effect of an increase in the legal drinking age on youth motor vehicle deaths. Our empirical research is based on a time series of state cross sections for the period from 1975 through 1981.
Logt motor vehIcle death rate regressions are obtained for three age groups: youths aged 15-17, youths aged 18-20, and youths aged 21-24.
During the period at issue, 15 states raised their legal drinking age, and 21 states raised their nominal excise tax rate on beer. Moreover there were substantial differences in both variables at a moment in time among states. We focus on teenagers and young adults in the context of the antidrinking campaign because motor vehicle accident mortality is the leading cause of death of persons under the age of 35, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1983) estimates that alcohol is involved in over half of these fatal accidents. In 1979 persons under the age of 25 accounted for 22 percent of all licensed drivers but 38 percent of all drivers involved in fatal accidents (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1983). These figures are even more dramatic than they appear because members of the young driver group do not drive nearly as much as older drivers (Voas and Moulden 1980) . In 1980 the motor vehicle accident mortality rate of persons between the ages of 15 and 24 was 45 deaths per 100,000 population (National Center for Health Statistics 1984). This figure was approximately twice as large as either the crude motor vehicle death rate or any other age-specific motor vehicle death rate.
Research on the responsiveness of youth motor vehicle deaths to the cost of beer is particularly timely in light of proposals to correct the erosion in the real value of the Federal excise tax rates on all forms of alcoholic beverages since 1951 and to prevent future erosion by indexing tax rates to the rate of inflation or by converting to an ad valorem alcoholic beverage excise tax system (for example, Moore and Gerstein 1981; Luks 1983; Cook 1984; Harris 1984; Becker 1985; Jacobson and Albion 1985) .2 Moreover, although beer is the drink of choice among youths who drink alcoholic beverages (for example, Coate and Grossman 1986; Coate, and Arluck forthcoming), the alcohol in liquor is taxed three times as heavily as the alcohol in beer. This has led to suggestions to equalize the tax rates on the alcohol in all forms of alcoholic beverages by raising the tax on beer (for example, Harris 1984; Jacobson and Albion 1985) .
Research on the sensitivity of youth alcohol use to legal drinking ages is also valuable given the adverse reaction to Federal uniform drinking 4 legislation, its scheduled expiration at the end of fiscal 1988, and volatility in state minimum drinking ages in the 1970s and 1980s.
There have been no previous studies of the effects of beer taxes on youth motor vehicle fatalities. Cook (1981) , however, finds that states that raised their excise tax rates on liquor between 1960 and 1974 experienced below-average increases or above-average reductions in motor vehicle deaths of persons of all ages relative to states that did not increase their tax rates. Given the popularity of beer among young people and their poor driving records, it is crucial to obtain estimates of the Impacts of beer excise taxes on youth motor vehicle death rates.
Statistically significant short-run increases In youth motor vehicle deaths have been reported in selected states that lowered their legal drinking age in the early 1970s, and significant short-run reductions in fatalities have been reported in selected states that raised their legal drinking age in the late 1970s or early 1980s (for example, Williams et al. 1975 Williams et al. , 1983 Douglass 1980; Wagenaar 1983; Lillis, Williams and Williford forthcoming) . While this research Is valuable, it is state-specific and thus cannot be generalized to the population of all youths in the U.S.
More definitive estimates are contained in studies by McCornac (1982) and 
II. Analytical Framework
The basic model employed in this paper consists of two equations. One is a technical relationship or a production function in which the probability that a youth will experience a fatal motor vehicle accident (ii) is positively related to his consumption of alcohol (y)5 and also depends on a vector of additional variables (z):
= rr(y,z).
( 1) Examples of members of the z vector include highway density in the state in which the youth resides and the general quality and state of repair of the motor vehicle that he drives. The second equation is a behavioral relationship or a demand function for alcohol:6 y = y(p,x). In this equation p is the price of alcohol, and x is a vector whose members include the youth's command of real resources, the prices of substitute goods, and tastes or preferences.
Substitution of equations (2) into equation (1) yields a reduced form probability of death equation:
Equation (3) is termed a reduced form equation because alcohol consumption, an endogenous right-hand side variable in equation (1), has been replaced by its exogenous determinants. Of course, the demand function for alcohol also is a reduced form equation.
Our empirical aim in this paper is to estimate equation (3) using data for states of the U.S. This aim is facilitated by aggregating the equation over the n youths in the th state and by interpreting the resulting pro-bability of death as the observed motor vehicle mortality rate. The priricipal hypothesis tested is that youth alcohol consumption is negatively related to its price, and therefore the youth motor vehicle accident mortality rate is negatively related to the price of alcohol. In testing this hypothesis, we define price broadly as the sum of the direct cost of alcohol and the indirect cost that must be incurred to obtain it. In particular, the indirect cost of obtaining alcohol for a person under the age of 21 should be lower in states where the legal drinking age is 18 as opposed to 21. Thus, subject to certain modifications in Section III, the money price of alcohol and the legal drinking age play symmetrical roles in the reduced form motor vehicle mortality equation.
III. Empirical Implementation
The data set employed here is a time series of state cross sections and consists of the 48 contiguous states of the U.S. for the years 1975 through 1981. Hence there are 336 observations in each regression estimated in Section IV. Alaska and Hawaii were omitted from the data set because several important variables were missing for these two states. The District of Columbia was omitted because it is a much smaller physical area than any of the 48 states, and it is likely that many of its motor vehicle accidents involve nonresidents. Table 1 contains definitions, means, and standard deviations of the variables in the data set. A detailed description of the variables and their sources appears in the Appendix to this paper (available upon request). The Appendix also includes a discussion of the theoretical roles of variables other than the real beer tax, the beer Youths between the ages of 15 and 17 and between the ages of 21 and 24 are not excluded entirely from the analysis because they have higher motor death rates than any other age group except for 18 to 20 year olds. Thus, it is of interest to assess the impacts on these death rates of differences in the cost of alcohol. A second consideration is that persons aged 21 through 24 or aged 15 through 17 may be passengers in cars driven by youths aged 18 through 20 and may die in crashes caused by these drivers.
A third reason for not limiting the analysis to youths aged 18 through 20 is that differences in the legal drinking age can affect motor vehicle fatalities of young teenagers and older youths. Since peers are a common source of alcohol (for example, Blane and Hewitt 1977) , the indirect cost of obtaining alcohol for persons younger than 18 is lower in states where the legal drinking age is 18 as opposed to 19, 20, or 21. To the extent that age at onset of alcohol consumption and current alcohol use are negatively related [see Rachal et al. (1975) for evidence that this is in fact the case], an increase in the legal drinking age can lower the motor vehicle death rate of 21-24 year olds (the "consumption" effect). As pointed out by Males (1986) , a factor that goes in the opposite direction is that persons beyond the age of 20 in states with low legal drinking ages may have more knowledge of the amount of alcohol they can safely consume shortly before driving (the "experience" effect).8
Studies of the impact of changes in legal drinking ages in individual states or in a small number of states by Williams et al. (1975 Williams et al. ( , 1983 , Douglass (1980) , and Wagenaar (1983) employ one or more of the following outcome measures: (1) nighttime fatal accidents involving youthful drivers; (2) nighttime single-vehicle fatal accidents involving youthful drivers; and (3) nighttime single-vehicle fatal accidents involving youthful male drivers. On the other hand, our outcome measure, like the one used by , is more comprehensive. We adopt it for reasons given by Cook and Tauchen. They point out (1984, pp. 174-175 Motor vehicle deaths by age were provided to us by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (N}ITSA) and come from unpublished data in NHTSA's Fatal Accident Reporting System.9 Deaths pertain to state of occurrence rather than to state of residence.
The key independent variables in the model are the legal drinking age and the price of alcohol. Both pertain to beer because of its popularity among youths. Moreover, Coate and Grossman (1986) and Grossman, Coate and Arluck (forthcoming) report that the consumption of beer by youths is inversely related to the price of beer and to the minimum legal age for its purchase and consumption. They also report that the magnitudes of these effects are substantial. On the other hand, the consumption of liquor or wine by youths is much less sensitive to the relevant beverage-specific price or legal drinking age, and there is no evidence that youths substitute liquor or wine for beer when the price of beer rises.
Youths who reside in a state with a high legal drinking age may be able to purchase and consume alcohol in a border state with a lower legal drinking age. In turn they may be killed in motor vehicle accidents that -12 -occur when they are returning from the border state. To deal with the border phenomenon (out-of-state purchases), we note that more youthful residents of the jth state are affected by it the greater is the difference between the legal drinking age in that state (ad) and the legal drinking age in the border state (ak, provided this difference is positive.
In addition, the border effect is larger the larger is the fraction of the population of state j that live in counties that border on state k (f).
Hence we define the border age variable (ba) as
0 if a < ak (4) and include it asa regressor. With the resident-state legal drinking age Antidrinking sentiment also should be an important force in states In which a higher-than-average fraction of the population reside in "dry" counties (counties that prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages). These states may enact high alcoholic beverage excise tax rates as part of the political process. In this situation, the tax coefficients that emerge from regressions that omit drinking sentiment overstate in absolute value the true parameters. On the other hand, states In which prodrinking sentiment is prevalent (antidrinking sentiment is weak) and alcohol consumption is large may enact high excise tax rates because the taxation of alcoholic beverages is an attractive source of revenue. In this case, the tax effects are understated if drinking sentiment is excluded from the regressions. Similar comments can be made with respect to drinking age effects that do not control for drinking sentiment.13
The role of drinking sentiment is considered in detail by Coate and Grossman (1986) in the context of a formal econometric model. They emphasize the point made above: namely, tax and legal drinking age effects are not necessarily overstated in absolute value when drinking sentiment is omitted from the regression model. This is particularly true If omitted proxies for drinking sentiment are correlated with those included. Our strategy here is to fit a set of regressions that excludes the religion variables and the fraction of the population who reside in wet counties and a second set of regressions that Includes these variables.
An alternative estimation strategy to control for hard-to-measure variables, such as drinking sentiment, is to employ dichotomous variables for 47 of the 48 states. This is the strategy adopted by in their study of youth motor vehicle fatalities described in Section I. In fact, the only other independent varIables In their model are the legal drinking age and dichotomous variables for 7 of the 8 years of their time series. Our approach, on the other hand, is to work with a more fully specified model of the determinants of youth motor vehicle accident mortality rates. This is because a model with state dummies has the potential of creating severe problems of multicollinearity. Nevertheless, we view a model with state dummy variables as a reasonable alternative to the one that we stress and present one regression for each of the three age groups that includes dichotomous variables for 47 of the 48 states. Since this specification is viewed as an alternative way to control for drinking sentiment, the religion variables and the fraction of the population residing in wet counties are omitted from it.
The actual motor vehicle mortality rate --defined as deaths per person rather than per 100,000 persons in the ith age group in the th state in year t --ranges between zero and one. Therefore, a logistic equation for the death rate is specified: 
which is called the logit function. The logit coefficient ik is the percentage change in the odds of motor vehicle mortality for a one unit change in Xjtk• Maddala (1983) shows that a regression estimate of equation (6) 
IV. Results
Weighted least squares regression estimates of logit motor vehicle mortality equations for youths aged 15 through 17, 18 through 20, and 21 through 24 are contained in Panels A, B, and C, respectively, of Table 2 .
Three regressions are shown in each panel. The first omits the religion variables and the fraction of the population who reside in wet counties, while the second includes these measures of drinking sentiment. The third regression excludes the five drinking sentiment variables but includes dichotomous variables for 47 of the 48 states. The logit coefficients of -.085 (-3.78) .072
( 14 At the point of means, the elasticity of the death rate with respect to the real beer tax is -.09 for the youngest age group and -.17 for the other two age groups.'5 Data contained in Coate and Grossman (1986) How reasonable are elasticities that range from -.7 to -1.3? Cook (1981) estimates an elasticity of the motor vehicle death rate of persons of all ages with respect to the price of liquor of -.7. Thus our elasticities appear to be quite reasonable. This is particularly true because Coate and Grossman (1986) present arguments that suggest that youth price elasticities of demand for alcoholic beverages may be larger in absolute value than the corresponding adult price elasticities.
Based on the first two regressions in Panels A through C, the only negative and statistically significant legal drinking age coefficients pertain to youths aged 18 through 20. These are extremely plausible results because 18 through 20 year olds should be most affected by differences in the drinking age, which ranges from 18 to 21. The border age coefficients have the appropriate positive signs for the middle age group in regressions (2-B1) and (3-B2). In the latter model the coefficient is significant.
The above conclusions are not altered when the border age is omItted from the regressions. As shown by the first two regression specifications in Table 3 , the legal drinking age coefficients remain significant for youths aged 18 through 20. But the coefficients are not significant for the two other groups.16 The drinking age coefficient in regression (3-2)
is almost 30 percent smaller in absolute value than the corresponding coefficient in regression (2-B2), indicating that the magnitude of the estimated effect is somewhat sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the border age. The parameter estimates of the other regressors (not shown in Table 3) are very similar to the corresponding estimates in Panels A through C of elasticities: -1.0 for the youngest age group, -.8 for the middle age group, and -1.0 for the oldest age group.
An increase in the number of vehicle miles traveled per licensed driver or in the fraction of youths aged 15 through 24 who are licensed drivers raises each of the three age-specific death rates. The elasticity of the death rate with respect to the number of vehicle miles traveled per licensed driver is unity for each age group. A similar comment applies to the magnitude of the elasticity of the death rate with respect to the fraction of youths aged 15 through 24 who are licensed drivers. These results underscore the plausibility of our empirical specification because they imply that deaths per miles traveled by licensed drivers do not depend on miles traveled per licensed driver or on the fraction of licensed drivers.'7 States that require compulsory inspection of motor vehicles every year have lower death rates than other states. Except for the middle age group, this effect is significant only when the drinking sentiment measures are held constant.
Comparing the first and second regressions in each panel of Table 2 , one sees that the signs, significance levels, and magnitudes of the tax and legal drinking age effects are not in general affected by the inclusion of the drinking sentiment proxies. If anything, the significant coefficients become larger in absolute value when the religion variables and the fraction of the population residing in wet counties are added to the set of regressors. This is an important finding because it means that the tax and drinking age effects emphasized here are not artifacts of the endogeneity of state laws and decisionmaking. The estimated income and highway coef- Baptists are prevalent, although the latter effect never is significant.
But death rates also fall as the fraction of the population who are Protestants or Catholics rises. This result is puzzling because Coate and Grossman (1986) find that the frequency of beer consumption by youths is positively related to the prevalence of Protestants and Catholics in their area of residence. We offer no explanation of the finding.
We note, however, that our conclusions with respect to the tax and legal drinking age effects are not altered when the religion variables or the fraction of the population who reside in wet counties are omitted from the drinking sentiment vector.
The third regression in Panels A through C of Table 2 18 through 20 year olds, which were negative and significant in the second regression model, rises by slightly more than 50 percent in absolute value.
The drinking age coefficients for 15 through 17 year olds switches signs from positive to negative and becomes significant. For the oldest age group, the negative drinking age coefficient rises by a factor of four and becomes significant.
The above results suggest that a model with state dummies is overdetermined and plagued by multicollinearity. The implausible nature of the estimates that emerge from this specification provides a justification for not emphasizing it. The tax effects rise in absolute value when the state dummies are held constant, except for the middle age group where the coefficient is virtually unchanged. Thus, the negative tax effects that we report are quite robust. In particular, they cannot be attributed to unmeasured state-specific variables.
To evaluate the potential impacts of the Federal excise tax and legal drinking age policy initiatives discussed in Section I, we simulate their effects on youth motor vehicle accident mortality rates. Specifically, first we compute the "actual" mortality rate for a given age group by predicting the mortality probability for the jth state in year t(j.) based on the logit coefficients and the actual values of the independent variables (xjtk) for that observation [see equation (5)]. Then we obtain the actual death rate as a weighted average of the 336 computed probabilities (48 states times 7 years) multiplied by 100,000. The weight is the fraction of the total population of all youths in the th age group in the period from 1975 through 1981 who reside in the th state in year 18 Next we vary one or more of the independent variables by a certain amount, recompute each irj., and average to obtain to the "new" mortality rate.
-24 -
The simulations are restricted to 18 through 20 year olds because public policy with respect to the legal drinking age focuses on this age group.
Simulations based on the second regression model in Table 2 
where is the state excise tax rate in nominal terms, c5i is the CPI in year t relative to 1951, and cr67 is the CPI in year t relative to 1967. The second tax policy raises the excise tax on a case of beer from $.64 to $2.09 to equalize the rates at which the alcohol in beer and liquor are taxed (see note 3). It is termed the alcohol tax equalization policy.
In this simulation the real beer tax is given by = (r + $2.O9)/(c67).
(8)
The third tax policy combines the first two and is termed the combined tax policy. The real beer tax becomes ci = [rt + ($2.O9)(ct,5i)1/(c67).
The resulting simulation shows the mortality rate that would have prevailed aDeath rate and absolute change are expressed in terms of deaths per 100,000 population. Absolute change equals the actual death rate minus the death rate predicted by one of the four policies at issue. Percentage change equals the absolute change divided by the actual death rate and multiplied by 100. It is notable that a 12 percent increase in the price of beer which accompanies the Inflation tax policy appears to have a larger impact than a 10 percent increase in the legal drinking age even when the 12 percent drinking age effect from Panel B is used in the comparison. In part this conclusion is reached because many states had legal drinking ages of 21 in one or more years of the period. Therefore, we have simulated the death rates of 18 through 20 year olds under the assumption of a uniform legal drinking age of 18. Based on the regression model with the antidrinking sentiment measures, the mortality rate in the latter simulation exceeds the one in the simulation with a drinking age of 21 by 7 deaths per 100,000 population. The corresponding differential in the regression with the state dummies is 10 deaths per 100,000 population. The former differential but not the latter is smaller than the 8-deaths--per-100,000-population reduction produced by the policy to adjust the beer tax for inflation. It does not follow that we have provided enough evidence to justify the approximately eight fold (thirteen fold based on the 1984 CP1) increase in the Federal excise tax on beer that is implicit in the most comprehensive tax policy. Excise tax hikes impose welfare costs on all segments of the population, while a drinking age policy is targeted at the group in the population that accounts for a disproportionate share of motor vehicle accidents and deaths. On the other hand, the enforcement and administra--30 -tive costs associated with a uniform minimum drinking age of 21 may exceed those associated with the tax policy. Moreover, our results indicate that an excise tax increase lowers death rates of youths between the ages of 15 and 17 and between the ages of 21 and 24. These benefits do not accompany a rise in the drinking age. In addition, the tax policy may reduce fatal crashes involving adults.
Finally, Becker (1968) has shown that the optimal way for a society to deter offenses is via a system of monetary fines. Of course, youthful drunken drivers may respond to an increase in the fine for this offense only if the probabilities of apprehension and conviction are nontrivial.
If substantial resources must be allocated to raising these probabilities, the excise tax policy may be preferable to or complementary with a system of large fines. In conclusion more research is required to formulate the best mix of policies to deal with youth motor vehicle accident mortality.
Our study represents a useful step in this process. 2Under an ad valorem alcoholic beverage excise tax system, the tax rate would be set at a fixed proportion of wholesale price. 51f a youth never drives while under the influence of alcohol, an increase in alcohol consumption would not increase his probability of dying in a motor vehicle crash. We believe, however, that it is reasonable to suppose that the number of times that a youth drives while under the influence of alcohol or is driven by a friend in this state is positively related to his consumption of alcohol, at least for the average youth. 1976 , 1977 , and 1978 (see Ornstein and Hanssens 1985 and Coate and Grossman 1986 . In addition to the reasons given above, this price is not used here because it would have to be predicted for the years 1975, 1979, 1980, and 1981 '3Although it might appear as if the drinking age effect is overstated, this need not be the case. For example, adult voters in a state with a vocal minority who opposes alcohol consumption may enact a high legal drinking age to prevent the minority from campaigning to raise alcohol excise tax rates. To cite another illustration, the high mortality rate in a state where prodrinking sentiment is widespread may result in the enactment of a high legal drinking age.
'4Statements concerning statistical significance in the text are based on one-tailed tests except when the direction of the effect is unclear on a priori grounds or when the estimated effect has the "wrong sign." In the latter cases two-tailed tests are used. When no significance level is indicated, it is assumed to be 5 percent.
'5These elasticities are based on the second regression in each panel.
The formula for the elasticity (c1) is
where is the real beer tax and is its logit coefficient. We evaluate c at the weighted sample means of and Xjtk (see Table 1 ). Note that the mean death rates in Table 1 must be divided by 100,000 before the elasticities are computed.
'6The negative legal drinking age coefficient for the 21 through 24 years olds in regression (2-C2) is not significant at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test. This is the appropriate test because the experience factor suggests a positive effect, while the consumption factor suggests a negative effect (see Section III). Since the age coefficient is negative, our results, like those of , do not support the experience hypothesis proposed by Males (1986 As shown by Table 4, differs from the corresponding mean in Table 1 . This is because the logit regression does not necessarily pass through the point of weighted arithmetic means. But the difference is very small; in a given regression model it is always less than 1 death per 100,000 population.
'9Since the excise tax and legal drinking age increases are non marginal and the logit functions are nonlinear, the simulations are employed to evaluate their effects. This is preferable to computing marginal price or legal drinking age effects at the point of means or for each observation and then multiplying by the change in the policy variable at issue.
20We computed the 4 percent figure based on If a state raised Its legal drinking age during the year rather than on January 1, the legal drinking age Is given as a weighted average of the two ages, where the weights are the fraction of months each age was in effect.
For example, suppose a state raised its legal age for the purchase of beer from 18 to 21 on April 1, 1980. Its legal drinking age for that year is (3/12)(18.00) + (9/12)(21.00) = 20.25.
This is the procedure employed by . vehicle death rates of all age groups by Fuchs and Leveson (1967) and Peltzman (1975) . The number of vehicle miles traveled per driver obviously reflects motor vehicle use and is expected to have a positive regression coefficient. In addition highway driving density probably rises as the number of miles traveled per driver rises. Highway driving density (the ratio of vehicle miles traveled to highway miles) has an ambiguous impact on mortality on a priori grounds. On the one hand, increased density is expected to increase the probability of an accident at a given speed and therefore the risk of death. On the other hand, increased density may force the average speed limit to be lower and can result in fewer deaths.
In preliminary regressions a density measure was not statistically significant, and its inclusion had almost no effect on the coefficients of the other variables.
In general young drivers are more accident prone than older drivers, A-4 possibly because the former group has a higher demand for risky driving (Peltzman 1975 Center (see Johnson, Picard, and Quin 1974; Quinn et al. 1982) . Estimates for other years were computed by logarithmis interpolation and extrapolation. Jews are included with non-church members in the omitted category because the size of the Jewish population was not reported in the 1971 survey and was significantly underestimated in the 1980 survey.
In preliminary research we experimented with variables pertaining to the availability and regulation of alcohol including the per capita number of establishments that are licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, a dichotomous variable that indicates whether off-premise alcoholic beverage stores are state owned and operated, a dichotomous variable that indicates whether drug and grocery stores can sell alcoholic beverages, and a dichotomous variable that indicates whether billboard advertising of alcoholic beverages is allowed. These variables contributed little to an understanding of the determinants of motor vehicle fatalities, and their inclusion had little impact on the coefficients of the basic regressors. These results are consistent with Arluck's (in progress) findings that youth alcohol use is not sensitive to the measures just defined. We also experimented with variables pertaining to the probability of apprehension and conviction for drunken driving and to the penalties for this offense. Our conclusions with respect to these variables were similar to those with respect to the availability and regulatory variables. In part this may reflect reverse causality. In particular, states with high death rates may allocate a substantial amount of resources to the apprehension and punishment of drunk drivers.
